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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael R. Parvin appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The district court presented this case's factual and procedural history as follows:
The Criminal Case
On September 15, 1999, Parvin was charged by Information with
Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen, a felony, and a violation of
Idaho Code[§] 18-1508. On December 16, 1999, Parvin entered a plea of
guilty to that charge. On February 14, 2000, Judge Morfitt sentenced
Parvin to the Idaho State Board of Corrections for a minimum determinate
period of ten (10) years up to life imprisonment. The Judgment and
Commitment was filed on February 23, 2000.
On June 12, 2000, the Canyon County Public Defender filed a
Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant [sic] to Idaho Criminal Rule 35.
After granting the defendant additional time to submit supporting
documentation, the court issued its Order Granting Motion for Reduction
of Sentence on September 26, 2000. At that time, Judge Morfitt reduced
the defendant's sentence from ten (10) years fixed to five (5) years fixed in
the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, and reduced the life
sentence to an indeterminate sentence of fifteen (15) years for a total
unified sentence of twenty (20) years.
On October 11, 2000, the State filed a Motion to Reconsider Order
Granting Motion for Reduction of Sentence. Parvin's Objection to the
motion was filed on October 17, 2000, and the State's Reply was filed on
October 26, 2000. On December 1, 2000, a hearing was held on the
State's motion, and at that time Judge Morfitt granted the State's Motion to
Reconsider and reinstated Parvin's original sentence pronounced in
February 2000. An Order to that effect was filed on December 8, 2000.
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Parvin filed a Notice of Appeal on December 26, 2000. The Idaho
State Court of Appeals issued its decision on appeal on June 21, 2002
and it was filed on June 25, 2002. The Remittitur was issued on
September 13, 2002 and filed on September 27, 2002. The Court of
Appeals affirmed Judge Morfitt's order vacating his order granting Parvin's
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion. In its analysis, the Court of Appeals held
that Judge Morfitt had no jurisdiction to grant Parvin's Rule 35 motion
because the district court had unreasonably delayed its ruling on the
motion.
The [F)irst Post Conviction Relief Petition
On September 17, 2003, Parvin filed a pro se Petition for Post
Conviction Relief in case number CV-2003-9086-C. On September 23,
2003, the court ordered the Canyon County Public Defender to represent
Parvin in his post conviction efforts. The State's Answer was filed on
October 9, 2003. On November 4, 2003, an Amended Petition for Post
Conviction Relief was filed along with the Affidavit of attorney, Dayo
Onanubosi. A Verified Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief was
filed on November 17, 2003. These documents were filed by the Canyon
County Public Defender. On November 18, 2003 the Canyon County
Public Defender filed a Notice of Conflict notifying the court that Van
Bishop would be handling the matter as conflict public defender.
On January 29, 2004, the State filed a Motion for Summary
Dismissal, along with its Answer to Amended Petition for Post Conviction
Relief. Van Bishop, attorney for Parvin, filed a Request for Trial and/or
Pre-Trial Setting on March 24, 2004. On October 21, 2005, a Notice of
Substitution of Counsel was filed by attorney Michael Duggan indicating
that Shari Dodge was being appointed as public defender conflict counsel
for Canyon County. Nothing in the file indicates when Michael Duggan
appeared in the matter as counsel for Parvin.
The file reflects that no additional action was taken until January
24, 2007 when a Notice of Proposed Dismissal was filed pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 40(c). On February 26, 2007 Judge Morfitt filed an
Order of Dismissal.
On May 22, 2008, Parvin filed a prose Notice of Appeal, along with
an Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Petition Appeal. On
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June 5, 2008, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an Order Conditionally
Dismissing Appeal, and on July 1, 2008, the Idaho Supreme Court issued
an Order Dismissing Appeal. The appeal was dismissed because it was
not timely filed in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 14.
The Second Post Conviction Relief Petition
On September 16, 2008, Petitioner Michael Parvin (Parvin) filed a
pro se Second Petition for Post Conviction Relief along with an Affidavit of
Facts in Support, and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. The matter
was originally assigned to Judge Thomas Ryan but on October 28, 2008
the State filed a Motion to Disqualify and the Order to Disqualify was filed
on October 29, 2008. The matter was assigned to Judge Gordon Petrie.
On November 3, 2008, an Order Appointing Attorney was filed granting
Parvin the services of the Canyon County Public Defender.
On January 13, 2009, Judge Morfitt filed an Order of Conditional
Dismissal [footnote omitted]. On January 23, 2009, Parvin filed a pro se
Response to Order of Conditional Dismissal and on January 30, 2009 the
Canyon County Public Defender filed a Response to Conditional
Dismissal. On April 1, 2009, the State filed a Motion for Clarification. A
hearing was scheduled for May 1, 2009, which was continued to May 15,
2009, and then continued again until July 15, 2009. At that hearing it was
determined that Parvin would be represented by the Public Defender in
this action and that all future pleadings or filings would be filed by that
office.
On September 22, 2009, the State filed a Motion for a Status
Conference because a new firm had recently taken over the contract for
public defender services in Canyon County. That status conference was
held on October 27, 2009. At that hearing, the court and counsel
scheduled hearings for a Motion for Summary Judgment to be held on
December 23, 2009 and an Evidentiary Hearing to be held on March 23,
2010. On December 22, 2009, the court received a Stipulation To
Continue Hearing in which the hearing was rescheduled for January 20,
2010 because the State had not filed the dispositive motion to be
considered at the December 23, 2009 hearing. On January 20, 2010, the
parties convened before this court and it was noted for the record that the
State had not filed its dispositive motion and that the court, concerned
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about the Petitioner's right to have the matter heard in a timely fashion,
would proceed with the evidentiary hearing scheduled for March 23, 2010.
On March 26, 2010, Parvin filed a Motion for Leave to File Third
Petition for Post Conviction Relief and on March 19, 2010, he filed a
Request for Judicial Notice. On March 19, 2010, the State filed a Motion
to Continue Hearing citing the new filings and a family emergency as
grounds for the continuance. On March 22, 2010, a hearing was held and
the evidentiary hearing was rescheduled for June 8, 2010. On June 1,
2010, Parvin filed an Amended Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition
for Post Conviction Relief and a Motion to Shorten Time to which the State
filed an Objection on June 3, 2010. On June 8, 2010, at the time set for
evidentiary hearing the court addressed the issue of the amendment. The
court granted Parvin's Motion to Shorten Time and the Motion for Leave to
File Amended Petition but also granted the State's oral motion for a
continuance. The evidentiary hearing was continued until July 13, 2010.
The State filed its Answer to Amended Petition on July 12, 2010.
On July 13, 2010, at the time set for evidentiary hearing, the
defendant was present and represented by James Wickham, Canyon
County Public Defender. Ty Ketlinski, Deputy Canyon County Prosecuting
Attorney, was present and represented the State. During the hearing, the
court took judicial notice of a number of documents related to the
underlying criminal case and Parvin's first Petition for Post Conviction
Relief. Parvin was the only witness. Parvin's Closing Memorandum was
filed on August 16, 2010, and the State's Closing Argument was filed on
August 17, 2010.
(R., pp.145-50.) 1
The district court denied and dismissed Parvin's petition for post-conviction relief.
(R., pp.145-161.) Parvin filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.163-64.)

1

The judicially noticed documents referenced by the district court have been included
in the Augmented Record.
4

ISSUE
Parvin states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it found that Mr. Parvin could not raise his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to his Rule 35 motion in post
conviction because it could have been raised on direct appeal?
(Appellant's brief, p.6.)
The State rephrases the issue as:
Has Parvin failed to establish error in the district court's ultimate denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief?

5

ARGUMENT

Parvin has Failed to Establish that he is Entitled to Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Parvin argues that the district court applied an incorrect legal analysis and

therefore erred when it denied Parvin's otherwise unanalyzed claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.

(Appellant's brief, pp.7-10.)

Review of the record, however,

shows that the district court did not apply an incorrect legal standard to Parvin's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his Rule 35 motion. Rather, the district
court dismissed the claim without analysis, a claim of error Parvin has failed to preserve
for appeal.

In the alternative, because Parvin failed to present any evidence at the

evidentiary hearing to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and because
any such claim in relation to a Rule 35 motion is legally deficient, the district court did
not err in denying Parvin's claim. Applying the correct legal standard, the district court's
ultimate denial of Parvin's petition should be affirmed on these independent grounds.

B.

Standard of Review
Because proceedings under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act are civil in

nature, where there is competent and substantial evidence to support a decision made
after an evidentiary hearing on an application for post-conviction relief, that decision will
not be disturbed on appeal. Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 826 P.2d 1337 (Ct. App.
1992).
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C.

The District Court Did not Apply an Erroneous Legal Standard When it Denied
Parvin's Claim that his Counsel was Ineffective in Relation to His Rule 35 Motion
Parvin argues that the district court erred by dismissing his ineffective assistance

of counsel claim as it related to his Rule 35 motion on the grounds that it could have
been raised on appeal. (Appellant's brief, p.7.) For the reasons noted by Parvin on
appeal, had the district court in fact ruled this way, that would have been an improper
basis for dismissal of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Review of the record,
however, shows that the district court dismissed Parvin's due process claim for either
failing to raise that claim on appeal, or having previously raised it. (R., pp.160-61, cf.
State v. Parvin, docket 27154, Appellant's brief, pp.8-9 (Augmentation).)

Parvin's

ineffective assistance of counsel claim in relation to his Rule 35 motion was never
analyzed by the district court, a fact which Parvin recognizes on appeal.

(See R.,

pp.145-61; Appellant's brief, p.8.) The district court's failure to put its analysis of the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the record has not been preserved for appeal.
Because Parvin's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his Rule 35
motion was not rejected for the reasons he states, Parvin has failed to show error.
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.

A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil

proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

Pizzuto v. State, 146

Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008); Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 945, 949, 908
P.2d 1252, 1256 (Ct. App. 1995). Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that, ''[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and
direct the entry of the appropriate judgment."
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I.R.C.P. 52(a).

Rule 52(b), however,

states that "[n]o party may assign as error the lack of findings unless the party raised
such issue to the trial court by an appropriate motion." I.R.C.P. 52(b).
Parvin notes that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to the
Rule 35 motion was "unanalyzed" by the district court. (Appellant's brief, p.8.) Review
of the record shows that the district court did not state its grounds for rejecting Parvin's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in pursuing his Rule 35 motion, if it addressed
the claim at all. In Parvin's final amended petition for post-conviction relief, the "grounds
on which [he based his] application for post-conviction relief' were:
(a) Ineffective assistance of counsel in the first Petition for Post Conviction
Relief (CV2003-9086-C) as described in the Affidavit of Facts filed
September 16, 2008 herein.
(b) Negligence by the District Court in losing jurisdiction to resolve a
pending Rule 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence and in sending notice
of dismissal of the Petition for Post Conviction Relief (CV2003-9086-C) to
the wrong address thereby not affording Petitioner the right to avoid
dismissal or timely appeal.
(c) Ineffective assistance of counsel in the underlying criminal action
(CR1999-7596-C) by failing to advise Petitioner of his right not to
participate in or to remain silent during the psychosexual evaluation and
that any statements could be used in aggravation of sentence and by
failing to ensure the District Court resolved his Rule 35 Motion for
Reduction of Sentence in a timely manner.
(d) Prosecutorial misconduct by the Canyon County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office by asking for a modification of the amended commitment
and sentence in violation of the Idaho Constitution by virtue of its failure to
comply with the notice requirements Article I, Section 22 of the Idaho
Constitution.
(e) Violation of Petitioner's rights to Due Process of Law guaranteed by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States of America and Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of the State
of Idaho by virtue of the State of Idaho's failure to allow the sentencing
judge to reconsider it's [sic] original sentence, by failing to afford Petitioner
a meaningful opportunity to present his claims in both the underlying
criminal action and first post-conviction proceeding (CV2003-9086-C) and
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by increasing the punishment after Petitioner began serving the amended
sentence.
(R., p.106 (emphasis added).) However, in its order denying Parvin's petition for postconviction relief, the district court omitted the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
as it related to the Rule 35 motion when it reiterated Parvin's claims. It noted:
In the petition, [Parvin] asserts the following allegations that serve as a
basis for this petition including the following:
• Ineffective assistance of counsel in the first Petition for Post Conviction
Relief.
• Negligence by the District Court in losing jurisdiction to resolve the
pending Rule 35 motion in the underlying criminal case.
• Negligence by the District Court in sending notice of dismissal of the
first Petition for Post Conviction Relief to the wrong address and
denying Petitioner the right to avoid dismissal or timely appeal.
• Ineffective assistance of counsel in the criminal case by failing to
advise Petitioner of his Estrada rights.
• Prosecutorial misconduct with respect to the Rule 35 motion in the
underlying criminal case.
• Violation of Petitioner's Due Process rights.
In addition, Parvin asserts the following claims for ineffective assistance of
counsel as grounds for his claims for post conviction relief:
• Against the Canyon County Public Defender - Failure to inform
Petitioner of his Estrada rights in the underlying criminal case.
• Against the Canyon County Public Defender - In the first Post
Conviction action, failure to assign a handling attorney, failure to
contact petitioner, failure to respond to Petitioner's attempts to contact
the attorneys, and failure to take any action on the petitioner resulting
in dismissal for inactivity.
• Against conflict Public Defender - failure to contact Petitioner, failure to
respond to Petitioner's attempts at contact, and failure to take any
action on the petition resulting in dismissal for inactivity.
• Against Shari Dodge - failure to contact Petitioner, failure to respond
to either the Notice of Intent to Dismiss or the Order of Dismissal,
failure to respond to Petitioner's attempts at contact, and failure to take
any action on the petition resulting in dismissal for inactivity.
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(R., pp.150-51.) Considering the effort the district court made to detail each claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the absence of any acknowledgment of Parvin's claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his Rule 35 motion for reduction of
sentence from the district court's reiteration of claims is especially noticeable.
In its order, the district court addressed Parvin's claims relating to his Rule 35
motion separately.

(R., pp.159-61.)

There, the district court noted that "the issue

presented to the Idaho Court of Appeals on appeal was the procedures taken with
regard to Parvin's I.C.R. 35 motion." (R., p.160.) It further explained that it could not
"second guess the Court of Appeals['] approach in making the decision [to deny Parvin's
appeal on jurisdictional grounds] or the decision not to address Parvin's concerns on the
merits." (R., p.161.) The unaddressed merits of Parvin's appeal included a claim that
Parvin's due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated
by the district court's order that rescinded his sentence reduction.

(State v. Parvin,

docket 27154, Appellant's brief, pp.8-9 (Augmentation).) This question of due process
is what the district court found it was prevented from revisiting "both by Idaho Code [§J
19-4901 (b) and relevant case authority." (R., p.161.)
In relation to the Rule 35 motion, the district court never addressed Parvin's claim
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather, it characterized all claims
relating to the Rule 35 motion as a deprivation of due process, noting that "Parvin
claims that the actions of [his public defender, the prosecutor, and the district judge]
denied him the opportunity to have his I.C.R. 35 motion granted and the unified
sentence of twenty (20) years imposed." (R., p.159.) The district court further noted
that, while Parvin may have criticized the public defender and prosecutor in their
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handling of his Rule 35 motion at the evidentiary hearing, his "efforts were focused on
Judge Morfitt's decision both in delaying his granting of the I.C.R. 35 motion and the
decision to vacate the order that amended Parvin's sentence." (R., p.160.)
In fact, at the evidentiary hearing, no evidence was presented that Parvin's
counsel had performed deficiently in relation to his Rule 35 motion. (See, generally, Tr.)
Rather, Parvin's argument was focused on this due process claim. He concluded that
argument saying:
On February 12, 2000, when Mr. Parvin was sentenced, he was notified
that he had a right to file a motion for modification of sentence. The only
restriction on that right was a time limit, and it told him he had 120 days
from the date sentence is imposed to file that motion.
He did file that motion - the motion was filed on his behalf within that
period.

Now it seems to me - and I am arguing to the court - that the right to a
Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence means you have the right to a
forum, an effective forum that has the authority to can [sic] grant that relief
if it is timely filed.

And in both cases, he has the right to effective assistance of counsel in
pursuing both of those avenues of relief.
Judge, Mr. Parvin did everything he could within his power, but he was
frustrated by a Court of Appeals a year or two later concluding after the
fact that Judge Morfitt lacked jurisdiction.
He was frustrated in his efforts by the actions of the then prosecuting
attorney in asking the Court to do something that [it] was constitutionally
prohibited from doing.

11

(Tr., p.51, L.2 - p.52, L.7.) This argument was further crystallized in Parvin's Closing
Memorandum where he wrote:
In the alternative, if Mr. Parvin's trial counsel was not ineffective in failing
to preserve the jurisdiction of the court, then Mr. Parvin's Due Process
rights were violated when the Court failed to provide him with a meaningful
forum in which to exercise his right granted by Rule 35 of the Idaho
Criminal Rules to have the Sentencing Court reexamine the sentence.
Due Process of Law requires that a right by given a meaningful forum to
be heard and considered. Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189 (Ct.
App. 2008). Earlier, the Court of Appeals recognized that prisoners must
be given access to the courts to attack their sentences, both directly (Rule
35 reconsideration) and collaterally (post conviction relief, inter a/ia).
Drennon v. Hales, 138 Idaho 850, 853 (Ct. App. 2003).
(R., pp.132-133.)
On appeal, Parvin claims that the district court erroneously dismissed his claim
that his counsel was ineffective in pursuing his Rule 35 motion because Parvin failed to
raise this claim on his prior appeal. Review of the record, however, shows that it was a
different claim, the denial of due process, which the district court dismissed on this
basis. The claim that Parvin had been deprived of his forum was a major focus of his
petition, and was a claim that he could have presented previously on appeal.

The

district court expressed no grounds for dismissing the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim as such, and even Parvin recognizes that this issue was not analyzed by the
district court. 2 Because the record contradicts Parvin's assertion that the district court
employed an erroneous theory in dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim
as it related to his Rule 35 motion, Parvin's claim of error fails.

2

As noted above, failure to address an issue put before the trial court is preserved for
appeal only if the deficiency is addressed to the trial court. I.R.C.P. 52(b).
12

D.

If Parvin's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim was Encompassed in the
District Court's Ruling Dismissing Claims in Relation to the Rule 35 Motion,
Alternative Grounds Support the District Court's Denial of the Claim and,
Because it was Ultimately Correct, the District Court Should be Affirmed
This Court will affirm an ultimately correct ruling made on an incorrect legal

analysis by applying the correct legal analysis. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21
P.3d 895, 901 (2001 ).

Applying the correct legal analysis, the district court was

ultimately right to deny Parvin's petition for post-conviction relief because Parvin failed
to present any evidence that his trial counsel was ineffective in relation to his Rule 35
motion, and because Parvin failed to show that he was entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel in a motion for reconsideration of sentence.

Upon these

alternative grounds, the district court should be affirmed.
1.

Parvin Failed to Present any Evidence that his Counsel was Ineffective in
Relation to the Rule 35 Motion

A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which the claim is based.

I.C.R.

57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92
Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969). To prevail on his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, Parvin was required to show that his attorney's performance was
objectively deficient and that he was prejudiced by that deficiency.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900
P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a deficiency, Parvin had the burden of
showing that his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that counsel's actions were not tactical.

Aragon v. State, 114

Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish prejudice, he was required
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to show a reasonable probability that, but for his attorney's deficient performance, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Argon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760
P.2d at 1177. Because Parvin failed to put on any evidence supporting either prong
during the evidentiary hearing, his claim is properly denied on its merits.
Parvin was the only witness called at the evidentiary hearing.

Regarding the

assistance he received from his trial counsel, Parvin's petition counsel argued that "trial
counsel in the underlying criminal action was ineffective, and we believe he was
ineffective from the day he was appointed." (Tr., p.9, Ls.13-16.)
Parvin testified that trial counsel advised Parvin to waive his right to a preliminary
hearing, because the hearing would only harm Parvin. (Tr., p.9, Ls.5-6; p.11, Ls.7-9.)
Parvin changed his plea to guilty and the case proceeded to sentencing where a
psychosexual evaluation was ordered. (Tr., p.11, Ls.17-22.) Parvin testified that his
counsel failed to inform him that he retained the right to remain silent throughout the
evaluation.

(Tr., p.11, L.20 - p.12, L.11.)

Parvin believed that the psychosexual

evaluation contained errors that his counsel chose not to address before sentencing,
because "making an issue of every point would only irritate the judge and complicate
matters." (Tr., p.13, L.16 - p.14, L.1.) After sentencing, Parvin's counsel "told [him] that
the appeal wouldn't be appropriate, but that he would work on a Rule 35." (Tr., p.15,
L.25-p.16, L.15.)
At the hearing, Parvin, through counsel, also requested that the district court
"take judicial notice that the Rule 35 was, in fact, made within the time period provided
by the rule."

(Tr., p.17, L.10 - p.18, L.8.)

Parvin testified that he had presented

additional information to his attorney after the Rule 35 motion was filed (Tr., p.17, Ls.4-
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9), but that his attorney never forwarded it to the district court (Tr., p.18, Ls.10-13). This
alleged information, however, was never presented to the district court at the evidentiary
hearing, nor was any other evidence of what it might have contained presented. (See,
generally, Tr.) Parvin did, however, testify that the district court reduced his sentence.
(Tr., p.18, Ls.14-18.)
Regarding the claims relating to his Rule 35 motion, Parvin testified that the
district court should have filed the order granting the reduction of sentence earlier. (Tr.,
p.42, Ls.12-13; p.43, Ls.9-22.) He further asserted that the district court was negligent
for losing jurisdiction on the Rule 35. (Tr., p.45, Ls.15-20.) And he asserted that the
prosecutor committed misconduct by requesting the district court to reconsider its
sentence reduction. (Tr., p.19, Ls.11-22; p.45, Ls.4-14.)
None of the evidence presented at the hearing supports Parvin's contention that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his Rule 35 motion. Parvin
did not put on any evidence that his counsel was objectively deficient. Parvin did not
put on any evidence that his counsel's actions, as opposed to the district court's delay,
in anyway prejudiced him.

In fact, as pointed out by the prosecutor during the

evidentiary hearing, as far as he could tell, "there's been no testimony that [trial counsel]
or whoever filed the Rule 35, there is nothing, in my mind, that shows that they did
anything wrong. They timely filed the Rule 35 motion." (Tr., p.54, Ls.2-7.) Indeed, the
only evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing regarding Parvin's trial counsel in

relation to the Rule 35 motion was that he filed the motion "within the time period
provided by the rule." (Tr., p.17, Ls.10-12.)

Parvin presented no evidence of either

element of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in relation to his Rule 35 motion.
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Therefore, he failed to meet his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that he was entitled to any relief on that basis.
Parvin had the burden of presenting actual evidence at the evidentiary hearing to
support his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his
Rule 35 motion. He failed to present any such evidence.

Having failed to establish

ineffective assistance of counsel by presenting evidence at the hearing, Parvin's claim
is correctly denied.
2.

Parvin's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Fails as a Matter of Law

Even had Parvin established a factual basis for his claim, his argument would still
be legally deficient. A person convicted of a crime has no constitutional right to counsel
in state post-conviction proceedings.

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-57

(1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1963).

The Sixth Amendment

guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel during all "critical stages" of the
adversarial proceedings against him. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d
833, 837 (2006) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); State v. Ruth,
102 Idaho 638, 637 P.2d 415 (1981 )). Although this right encompasses the first direct
appeal, it does not extend to post-conviction proceedings.
U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007); Finley, 481 U.S. at 555.

Lawrence v. Florida, 549

"The determination whether [a)

hearing is a 'critical stage' requiring the provision of counsel depends . . . upon an
analysis 'whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the ***
confrontation and the ability to help avoid that prejudice."' Coleman v. Alabama, 399
U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (asterisks original, quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 227).
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Rule 35 challenges do not create a critical stage of the proceedings.

United

States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496-97 (11th Cir.1991). This is because a Rule 35
motion can "only benefit the defendant by reducing his sentence which had already
become final," and does not entail a "do-over of an original sentencing proceeding."
United States v. Taylor, 414 F.3d 528,537 (4th Cir. 2005). There is, therefore, no Sixth
Amendment right to counsel on a Rule 35 motion. Taylor, 414 F.3d at 537; United
States v. Paloma, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1996). Where there is no constitutional
right to counsel, a defendant cannot be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.
Wainwright v. Toma, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982).
Parvin's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his Rule 35
motion is based entirely on a Sixth Amendment theory of the right to counsel.

But

Parvin's motion for a reduction of sentence was clearly post-conviction. He was not, at
that time, being confronted by the prosecutorial power of the State. The motion did not
create a critical stage of the proceedings. Parvin therefore had no constitutional right to
counsel in relation to his Rule 35 motion. Thus, his claim that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel fails as a matter of law and the district court was ultimately correct
to deny Parvin's petition.
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CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
denying and dismissing Parvin's petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 12th day of October, 2011.
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